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Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) is the technology responsible to hide the identification of Internet users,  
whereas network forensics is a technology responsible to reveal the identification of Internet users who perform  
illegal actions through the Internet. The paper identifies the collision of these opposite-goal technologies and  
describes what happens in case they come across. Can a Network Forensics protocol discover the identification  
of an Internet user who is trying to be anonymous behind a PET? The paper also proposes a way to bridge and  








users   to   discover   the   identity   of   others.   There   have   been   proposed   a   number   of   PETs   (Gritzalis,   2004; 
Anonymizer, 2003; Reiter and Rubin, 1998; Dingledine et al, 2004; Shields and Levine, 2000; Golle and Juels, 
2004; Moller et  al,  2003; Rennhard and Plattner,  2004) and Network Forensics (Carrier  and Shields,  2004; 











































































However,   the PET does not follow the STOP protocol;  otherwise the PET should reveal  the identity of  the 
attacker. Consequently, the Server will not be able to discover the malicious host (Host A).
 Figure 4 PET against STOP protocol under Stepping Stone attack
ForNet Protocol with PET







and 4th OSI Layers  to  track  the original  source of  a  message.  It   is,   therefore,   impossible  to be used in an 











Entity eavesdrops  the communication between the Attacker and the PET, or   it   is   just  an intermediate node 
between them.














































NEW NETWORK FORENSICS APPROACH
In order to make these two technologies avoid collisions and offer their services in an efficient manner to the 
Internet users, we need technologies which are able to separate the innocent users from the attackers. The PET 



















































Figure 6 PET as a warrantor



















the  other   technology  becomes   enhanced.  We  studied   their   behaviour   in  different   case   studies   and  we  can 
conclude that the PET has really been designed having in mind technologies that their purpose was to reveal the 
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